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Abstract
We examine the e⁄ect of strategic sale￿ the sale of banks to strategic
foreign investors￿ on banks￿performance. The Government of Indonesia im-
plemented such a policy as a part of bank restructuring in the aftermath of
the 1998 banking crisis. Using di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence models, we ￿nd that
strategic sale leads to 12%-15% cost reduction. These results are robust to the
use of other estimators such as di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence matching-estimators
and stochastic-frontier analysis, to that of other performance measures such
as return on assets and net interest margin, and also to that of di⁄erent types
of samples. These suggest that strategic sale could play an important role in
restructuring troubled banks in developing countries.
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11 Introduction
Banking crises may lead to painful recession and slow economic recovery. They also
often call for the government to recapitalize distressed banks and restructure the
industry, which may cost government budget dearly.1
Government typically implements a mix of regulatory forbearance, loan write-
o⁄s, asset workouts subsidy, debt forgiveness, bank recapitalization, and bank sale.
This policy mix could determine how soon banking industry stabilizes and banks
start lending.2 Because banking constitutes a large part of ￿nancial industry, es-
pecially in developing countries, bank restructuring would in turn a⁄ect how fast
economy is recovering.
In the aftermath of the 1998 banking crisis, the Government of Indonesia im-
plemented banking reform in which strategic sale￿ the sale private banks that the
government takes over and then recapitalizes to strategic foreign investors￿ was
one of the key policies. This move, like many privatization drives, drew controversy
and proved unpopular. Proponents argued that, in addition to helping the govern-
ment to ￿nance budget de￿cit, the sale would allow foreign investors to manage
the banks, and improve their performance, a lot better than the government agen-
cies did. Opponents rebutted that foreign investors might come in only for quick
￿nancial gain. Besides, some argued that the government sold the banks at ￿re-sale
prices; improving banks￿performance ￿rst before selling them would have given the
government better price o⁄ers.
We delve into this debate by empirically evaluating the e⁄ect of this strategic sale
on the banks￿performance. The central questions are the followings: Does strategic
1Bordo, et.al. (2001) estimate that on average GDP falls by more than 10%. Honohan and
Klingebiel (2003) estimate that, in 40 banking crises since 1980, bank resolution costs on average
13% of the countries￿GDP. Radelet and Sachs (2002) estimate that recent banking crises in several
East Asian countries cost even more, from 20% to 55% of the countries￿GDP.
2See, for example, Colomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004).
2sale improve banks￿costs e¢ ciency? How large is the average e⁄ect of strategic sale
on the banks￿costs? How does this e⁄ect evolve over time? Does strategic sale
improve other measures of banks￿performance such as return on assets (ROA), net
interest margin (NIM), and the amount of non-performing loans (NPL)?
The focus of this paper is overcoming problems in treatment evaluation. First,
we never observe counterfactuals and therefore we need to estimate them. Second,
typical analysis of the e⁄ect of privatization may su⁄er from selection bias. Investors
may "cherry pick" the most promising banks, and the government may sell only
the best banks to maximize revenue and these choices may not be orthogonal to
unobservable factors that a⁄ect banks￿performance.
Fortunately, the circumstances of the sale and, hence, the structure of our data,
to some extent, reduces this potential source of bias: The government does not
systematically choose which banks it sells to maximize revenue, and investors can
buy recapitalized private banks only because no other banks are for sale. Moreover,
to control for time-invariant unobserved banks￿characteristics that may confound
identi￿cation, we use panel data and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence models. Further, to
address some potential biases in di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence models, we use generalized
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence matching estimator.
To estimate the e⁄ect of strategic sale on banks￿costs, in a regression of (the
logarithm of) banks￿costs on a translog function of banks￿outputs and prices of
inputs and banks￿time-varying characteristics, we introduce a dummy for banks sold
to strategic investors. The coe¢ cient of this dummy would measure the average
e⁄ect of strategic sale on the performance of banks sold to strategic investors (the
average e⁄ect of treatment on the treated).
Our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates show that the strategic sale reduces banks￿
costs, and it does so quite signi￿cant economically. On average, banks sold to
3strategic investors have about 12%-15% lower costs.
The estimates of the combined di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence and matching models sup-
port this ￿nding. Using observations in the common support, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect
of the strategic sale is about 4%, although it is statistically insigni￿cant because
the number of observations shrinks considerably. However, using observations in a
less-strictly-de￿ned common support, the strategic sale is associated with 11% lower
costs. A generalized kernel di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator also shows similar re-
sults: Using observations in the less-strictly-de￿ned common support, the strategic
sale is associated with about 20% lower costs.
We do some robustness checks. Using a more homogenous sample of banks,
i.e. large private national banks only, we ￿nd that our results are quite robust.
We estimate the e⁄ect of the strategic sale using the stochastic frontier analysis,
and we get similar results. The evolution of the e⁄ect of strategic sale also reveals
similar pattern of cost reduction. During the acquisition quarter, we ￿nd no e⁄ect
of strategic sale. However, starting from the second quarter, the performance of
banks sold to strategic foreign investors improves so that by the second year they
enjoy cumulative 11%-20% lower costs. We also estimate the e⁄ect of strategic sale
on other performance measures using the generalized kernel di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
models. We ￿nd that strategic sale is associated with higher banks￿ROA and NIM,
and with a lower NPL.
Our results suggest that strategic sale improves banks￿performance and, hence,
could play an important role in banking restructuring.3 There are some reasons
why strategic sale improves performance. First, foreign strategic investors often
bring improved banking practices￿ e.g. sophisticated risk management practices,
and technology from their parent banks￿ that can boost the performance of the
3See also Tschoegl (2003) for a similar argument.
4acquired banks.4 Moreover, new investors may also employ better human capital
which will improve banks￿performance.5
Second, bailed-out banks may su⁄er from the usual problems of public enter-
prises, such as political intervention, ine¢ cient corporate governance, and the lack
of competitive pressure.6 When strategic foreign investors take controls of these
banks, they improve banks￿corporate governance and bring in a new management
team whose interests are more aligned with them. Moreover, because the banks are
not in the hands of the government anymore, the banks no longer su⁄er from any
political intervention.7
We are not aware of empirical studies which examine the e⁄ect of strategic sale
of recapitalized banks. However, some researchers have looked at the e⁄ect of the
sale of state-owned banks to strategic investors. Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2005),
in a recent survey of this literature, summarize that, if the government keeps no
shares of stocks in the banks, strategic sale improves banks￿performance.
This paper di⁄ers from the literature in at least two respects. First, rather
than relying on stochastic frontier analysis only, we use di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence and
matching models to address the problems in treatment evaluation. Second, the
structure of our data, to some extent, reduces potential sources of selection bias.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical methodology.
Section 3 describes our data, and Section 4 discusses our empirical results. Section
5 presents some robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
4See Claessens and Lee (2002).
5See, for example, Buch (1997) for a discussion on the impact of foreign ownership on banks￿
performance in Central and Eastern Europe.
6See, for example, Shirley and Walsh (2000) for a survey of theoretical and empirical literature
on the e⁄ect of privatization on ￿rm performance.
7We may argue that these public enterprise problems plague bailed out banks at lesser degree
because, unlike typical state-owned enterprises, government owns the banks for a short time only.
This implies that the e⁄ect of strategic sale of state-owned banks may be larger than that of
recapitalized banks we estimate here.
52 Strategic Sale of Indonesian Banks
Indonesia experienced a systemic banking crisis in 1997-1998. In the aftermath
of the crisis, many of the 176 domestic banks were heavily undercapitalized. The
capital adequacy ratios (CARs) of all 7 state banks were lower than -25%. Half of
the regional-development banks and private national banks had its CAR lower than
4%, while one ￿fth of the private national banks had its CAR lower than -25%.8
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
To resolve the crisis, the government established the Indonesian Bank Restruc-
turing Agency (IBRA), a centralized agency that is given a mandate to handle the
whole restructuring process. First IBRA categorized these banks into three cate-
gories, namely banks whose CARs were above 4%; banks whose CARs were between
4% and -25%; and banks whose CARs were less than -25% (see Table 1). Banks
belonging to the ￿rst category were exempted from the restructuring program and
could continue operating on the condition that their owners su¢ ciently increase
their banks￿capital. Failure to do so may lead to those banks being liquidated or
taken over by IBRA.9 Banks belonging to the second category were taken over and
recapitalized by IBRA. Their assets and equities were transferred to IBRA, and in
exchange for these assets and equities IBRA issued recapitalization bonds and paid
interests on these bonds. Banks belonging to the third category were discontinued
and their assets were liquidated. By the end of 1998, IBRA had closed down 48 pri-
8Private national banks are domestically owned banks, and can be categorized into large
private-national banks and small private-national banks. Only the former are allowed to trade
foreign currencies. Regional development banks are owned by their respective provincial govern-
ment. They are similar to state banks, but are typically smaller in size. We exclude the regional
development bank of Timor Timur from our sample since Timor Leste is now an independent
state.
9IBRA￿ s policies had not always been consistent, however. Some argue that IBRA￿ s mishaps
might actually aggravate Indonesia￿ s banking problems. See, for example, Pangestu and Habir
(2002) for the details.
6vate national banks; recapitalized all 7 state banks and merged 4 of them into one;
recapitalized 12 regional-development banks; and recapitalized 11 private national
banks and merged 9 others into a single bank. As part of IBRA￿ s exit strategy,
some of those recapitalized banks were then sold to strategic foreign investors.
In short, to resolve the systemic banking crisis, the Government of Indonesian
established an asset management institute, recapitalized banks, and sold the recapi-
talized banks to strategic foreign investors. The whole process of bank restructuring
eventually made the government a dominant player in the banking industry. In ad-
dition to controlling all state banks, IBRA also controlled 6 previously privately
owned banks. Pangestu and Habir (2002) estimated that by the end of 2000 the
government owned about 85% of the third party liabilities of the Indonesian banking
sector.
This banking overhaul, however, also severely strained the government budget.
In the year 2000, the government had to service debt that was more than 100%
of GDP and to ￿nance a budget de￿cit that was more than 4% of GDP. Facing
this large ￿scal de￿cit, the government simply had to think about an exit strategy.
They need to sell those recapitalized private-national banks in a timely manner so
as not to strain the government budget even further.
The burden created by the ￿scal de￿cit, and the scrutiny pressure imposed by
the IMF, arguably dictated the government￿ s decision to sell these banks to strate-
gic foreign investors. Cherry picking by investors consequently was not ubiquitous.
During the period of analysis, with an exception of one private bank, banks sold
to strategic foreign investors were the recapitalized private banks only. The gov-
ernment did not sell its best banks to maximize revenue either. The recapitalized
state-owned banks and regional-development banks were not for sale to foreign in-
7vestors.10
3 Methodology
We evaluate the e⁄ect of strategic sale on banks￿costs. The dependent variable in
our analysis is the logarithm of banks￿costs. The explanatory variables used in the
analysis are; a strategic-sale dummy variable that equals one if the bank is sold to
a strategic foreign investor and zero otherwise, a translog cost function as a control
variable11, and a vector of banks￿time-varying characteristics.
3.1 Identi￿cation, Estimation Method, and Hypothesis
The coe¢ cient of the dummy variable should capture the average e⁄ect of the strate-
gic sale. However, identi￿cation of the average e⁄ect of the strategic sale may not
be possible if the sale decision itself is not exogenous, for instance when investors
"cherry pick" the most promising banks to buy. This choice may not be orthogonal
to unobservable factors that a⁄ect banks￿performance such as banks￿reputation
or banks￿corporate culture. Likewise, to maximize revenue, the government may
choose to sell the best banks only, and this decision may be correlated with unob-
servable factors that a⁄ect banks￿costs. If this is the case, the correlation between
10The sale drew public controversies. Some members of the lower house of representative even
opposed the government￿ s decision to sell these banks. In fact, a number of times the government
delayed banks￿scheduled sales. However, in the end, IBRA went ahead with the sale of the
recapitalized private banks to strategic foreign investors.
11A translog cost function can be written as follows:




























where yi is the value of output i and wj is the price of input j.
8the strategic sale and banks￿performance would be confounded by the e⁄ect of, for
example, banks￿intangible assets. Fortunately, the circumstances of the sale, and
hence the structure of our data, to some extent, eliminates these potential sources
of bias. The government simply has to sell these banks within a reasonably short
period of time.
In any case, the unobservable characteristics that may confound identi￿cation
are most likely those that vary across banks but ￿xed over time. To control for
this time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we use panel data and di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence estimation. More speci￿cally, we can specify the di⁄erence-in di⁄erence
model as a two-way ￿xed e⁄ect regression model as follows:12
cit = ￿Sit + f(xit;￿) + ￿zit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it; (1)
where cit is the logarithm of bank i￿ s costs in period t, Sit is a strategic-sale dummy
variable equals one if bank i in period t is owned by a strategic foreign investor
and zero otherwise, f(xit;￿) is a translog cost function where xit is a vector of
arguments of the cost function of bank i at time t, zit is a vector of time-varying
bank i￿ s characteristics at time t, ￿i is bank i￿ s ￿xed e⁄ect, and ￿t is the time e⁄ect at
time t. The banks￿￿xed e⁄ect would capture time-invariant characteristics unique
to bank i. The time e⁄ect would proxy all common factors that a⁄ect costs of all
banks in period t that are uncontrolled for in Equation (1).
12We write a bank￿ s costs as a function of a vector of observable variables x and unobservable
variable u:
c1t = g1 (x) + u1t and c0t = g0 (x) + u0t
where c1t is the bank￿ s costs at time t if the bank is sold to strategic investors, and c0t is the bank￿ s
costs at time t if the bank is not sold. If the expected conditional costs only di⁄er by a constant
￿, that is g1 (x) = ￿ + g0 (x) and u1t = u0t, then the general di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator
b ’ = E (c1t ￿ c1t0jx;D = 1) ￿ E (c0t ￿ c0t0jx;D = 0)
reduces to ￿ in a two-way ￿xed e⁄ect model, where t0 is the pretreatment period, t is the post-
treatment period, and D equals one if the bank is sold to strategic investors during the period of
analysis and zero otherwise.
9The error term ￿it is the time-varying error, which is assumed to be distributed
independently of ￿i and ￿t. However, the error term ￿it may be correlated across
banks and time. To address potential biases in the estimation of standard errors,
we estimate the Huber/White heteroskedasticy robust standard-errors as well as
the standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation.
Our primary interest is therefore the sign and magnitude of ￿, the coe¢ cient
of the strategic sale dummy. We want to compare the costs of banks that are sold
to strategic foreign investors to the counterfactual, i.e. the costs of those banks
if they had not been sold to strategic foreign investors. Unfortunately, we never
observe the counterfactual, and thus we must estimate the counterfactual using the
changes in the cost structure of banks in the control group, i.e. a comparator group
consisting of recapitalized banks that are not sold to strategic foreign investors
and have similar observed-characteristics, before and after the intervention. We
then could interpret ￿ as the di⁄erence between the outcomes in the treated group
consisting of the recapitalized banks sold to the strategic foreign investors before
and after the intervention and the corresponding changes in the counterfactual, i.e.
the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of the average e⁄ect of the strategic sale on
banks￿costs.
We take as our null hypothesis that, controlling for the relevant explanatory-
variables, banks￿costs would remain the same whether or not these banks are sold
to strategic foreign investors.
Hypothesis : The strategic sale does not a⁄ect banks￿costs.
A negative and large absolute value of ￿ would contradict our hypothesis, im-
plying that those banks that are sold to strategic foreign investors do experience
cost reduction. A positive and large ￿, on the other hand, would instead suggest
10that costs of those banks have increased.
3.2 Heterogeneous Treatment E⁄ects
In Equation (1) we assume that the impact of the strategic sale is homogenous
across banks. If treatment e⁄ects are heterogeneous, the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimates may su⁄er from two additional sources of bias (Heckman, Ichimura, and
Todd 1997). Firstly, bias may arise if there are no banks in the control group that
is comparable to banks in the treated group, and vice versa. Secondly, bias may
also arise if the distribution of vector of the observable variables that a⁄ect banks￿
costs in the treated group is di⁄erent from that in the control group.
We eliminate these two potential sources of bias using matching estimator tech-
nique. We pair all banks sold to strategic foreign investors in the treated group
with corresponding banks in the control group. Comparing banks in the treated
group with banks in the control group eliminates the ￿rst bias. Re-weighting the
control group observations in the estimation eliminates the second bias.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we match the treated and untreated
banks using their propensity scores which are de￿ned as the conditional probability
of receiving treatment given observable pretreatment-characteristics x, i.e. P(x) =
Pr(D = 1jx). Conditional on P(x), we assume that the counterfactual outcome
distribution of treated banks is the same as the observed outcome distribution of
the control banks.
We estimate a logit model of the probability that a domestically owned bank is
acquired by a strategic foreign investor during the period of analysis as a function
of some pretreatment characteristics. We then use the logit model to predict the
propensity scores, the probability that a bank will be sold to a strategic foreign
investor.
11We construct the common support of the distribution of x for the treated and
control banks in two ways. Firstly, we drop observations whose propensity scores
do not overlap across treated- and control groups. We call the resulting support as
Common Support 1. Secondly, we exclude all observations whose propensity scores
are higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity scores of the
controls. We call the resulting support as Common Support 2. We then re-estimate
the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model using each of these de￿nitions of the common
support.
We also estimate the average treatment e⁄ect on the treated using matching
estimator. We use the generalized di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence matching estimator pro-
posed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) which extends the conventional
matching estimator to panel data. Hence, by controlling for the bank￿ s ￿xed e⁄ect,
we allow for the possibility that the selection into treatment may depend on the
time-invariant unobservable variables.13
4 The Data
The data is taken from the quarterly ￿nancial statements of the Indonesian banking
industry. Our sample period spans from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the second
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where G(:) is a Gaussian Kernel function, P￿ s are the propensity scores, and bn is a bandwith
parameter.
12quarter of 2005. There are 132 banks in the sample. We focus only on domestically
owned banks, and thus we exclude foreign-owned banks and joint-venture banks
from our sample. These two types of banks were not subjected to the strategic sale,
and they had already been owned by foreign investors. Domestically owned banks
are composed of 35 large private national banks, 37 small private national banks,
and 26 regional-development banks.14 Some private national banks are publicly
listed in the stock market. All banks sold to strategic foreign investors are large
private national banks (see Table 2).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Our dependent variable, cit, is the logarithm of banks￿costs. We de￿ne banks￿
costs as the sum of banks￿operating and non-operating costs as reported in the
income statements. The operating costs consist of interest expenses, general and
administrative expenses, and personnel expenses. Table 3 shows the summary sta-
tistics of variables used in our analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The strategic sale dummy, Sit, equals one if bank i in period t is owned by a
strategic foreign investor and zero otherwise. We obtain information on ownership
and its evolution from the composition of shareholders reported in banks￿quarterly
￿nancial statements. For some banks the information on ownership and on the sale
of assets to foreign investors may not be consistently available throughout the whole
period under study. Hence, for these banks we gather news about changes in their
ownership structure and the sale of assets through several Indonesian newspapers.
Another source of information that we use is the letters of intent of the Indonesian
14Later, to check for the robustness of our results, we also focus on only homogenous banks.
13Government published at the IMF￿ s website. These letters provide progress reports
on the sale of some of these banks.
We use deposits, loans, and a measure of the unit price as the arguments of the
cost function, f(xit;￿). Deposits and loans are, respectively, the sum of all type of
deposits and loans reported in banks￿balance sheets. Our measure of the unit price
is the ratio between banks￿operating costs to banks￿assets. All arguments of the
cost function are expressed in their logarithmic forms in our regressions. The cost
function itself takes a translog form. Thus, in our regressions we express the cost
function as the sum of the logarithms of deposits, loans, and the unit price, their
square terms, and their interactive terms.15
We also include some time-varying bank characteristics, zit, that may a⁄ect
banks￿costs, such as banks￿liquidity, non-performing loans and banks￿capital ad-
equacy ratio (CAR). They enter in our regressions as respectively, the lagged of




Table 4 presents our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates of the impact of strategic sale
on the percentage change in banks￿costs. Column (1) reports the estimation result
obtained using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model that only includes the strategic sale
dummy and the time- and bank ￿xed e⁄ects. We ￿nd that the strategic sale is
associated with 31% lower costs, and the impact is signi￿cant at 1% level.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
15See footnote (10) for the general form of a translog function.
14However, di⁄erent banks may employ di⁄erent types of technology, and the
choice of technology may in￿ uence the way banks reduce their costs over the period
of analysis. We therefore control for banks￿technology by introducing a translog
cost function into our estimation. We also allow for publicly listed banks to have
di⁄erent intercept from non-publicly listed banks by adding a dummy variable which
equals one if banks are publicly listed and zero otherwise. Similar to our previous
estimation, the strategic sale lowers banks￿costs by about 15% (see Column 2).
Albeit smaller than the previous estimate, it still remains relatively large. It is also
statistically signi￿cant at 1% level.
We further control for some observed time-varying bank characteristics that may
a⁄ect banks￿costs such as banks￿liquidity, non-performing loans and banks￿CAR.
We ￿nd that the strategic sale continues to be associated with lower costs, i.e. about
12% on average, and the impact is statistically signi￿cance at 5% level (see Column
3).16
As is mentioned earlier, if the impact of the strategic sale is not homogeneous
across banks, but instead depends on the characteristics of banks, then our estimates
may be bias. To eliminate the bias we employ a generalized di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
matching estimator technique.
5.2 Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence Matching Estimator
To proceed, we estimate the propensity scores using a logit model of the probability
that a recapitalized bank that was under the control of IBRA before the last quarter
of 2000 was sold to a strategic foreign investor by the ￿rst quarter of 2001, as a
function of pretreatment characteristics. We take the pretreatment characteristics
to be banks￿characteristics in the last quarter of 2000. In case that the data on
16The three additional time-varying bank characteristics however are statistically insigni￿cant.
15banks￿characteristics are not available for this period, we use the ￿rst quarter
of 2001 instead. We try various alternatives of pretreatment characteristics, such
as; the arguments of our translog cost function and some measures of banks￿pre-
treatment performance that include liquidity, pro￿tability, CAR and the value of
non-performing loans. However, many of these variables turn out to be statistically
insigni￿cant. In the end, we settle with a simpler Cobb-Douglass cost function as
a proxy of our pretreatment characteristics.
Columns (1-3) and (5-7) in Table 5 present the results of our di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence matching estimations using only observations in the common support,
i.e. either Common Support 1 or Common Support 2.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
In Common Support 1, the sample consists of 10 banks only, and the number of
observations falls drastically to around 178. For our basic speci￿cation that includes
a proxy for banks￿technology and a dummy variable for publicly listed banks (see
Column 2), we ￿nd that the strategic sale is associated with 4% reduction in costs,
unfortunately the impact is statistically not signi￿cant. We ￿nd an almost similar
result when we control our analysis for observed time-varying bank characteristics
(see Column 3). Similar to our basic results presented in Table 4, these additional
control variables are also statistically insigni￿cant.
In Common Support 2, the sample consists of most observations in our original
sample. For our basic speci￿cation that includes a proxy for banks￿technology and a
dummy variable for publicly listed banks (see Column 6), we ￿nd that the strategic
sale is associated with 16% of cost reduction. When we control our analysis for
observed time-varying bank characteristics (see Column 7), the cost reduction e⁄ect
of the strategic sale falls to 11%. They are statistically signi￿cant at respectively
161% and 10% level.17
We also relax the assumption of linear relationship between the strategic sale
and banks￿costs by estimating the average e⁄ect of the strategic sale using semi-
nonparametric matching estimators. Columns (4) and (8) in table 5 show the
average treatment e⁄ect on the treated of the strategic sale on banks￿costs ob-
tained from a generalized di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence kernel matching estimator. Using
observations in Common Support 1, we ￿nd that the average treatment e⁄ect on
the treated is positive, although it is statistically not signi￿cant (see Column 4).
Using observations in Common Support 2, however, the strategic sale is associated
with 21% reduction in costs, and it is statistically signi￿cant (see Column 8).
5.3 Some Further Issues
All in all our results show that the sale of recapitalized banks to strategic foreign
investors does improve banks performance, i.e. reduces banks￿costs. Some caveats,
however, are in order. Firstly, even though most of our estimates are statistically
signi￿cant when we use observations in Common Support 2 in our regressions, they
are insigni￿cant when we use observations in Common Support 1. This is probably
due to the drastic fall in our sample-size when observations in Common Support 1
are used and at the same time we have a large number of bank- and time ￿xed-e⁄ects
in the regressions.
Secondly, our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimators rely on the assumption that the
change in banks￿costs in the control group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfac-
tual. The reliability of our estimates naturally depends on whether this assumption
is satis￿ed. In other words, consistent estimation of the average treatment e⁄ect
on the treated, ￿, in Equation (1) requires that the change in banks￿costs in the
17Among the three additional control variables, only banks￿liquidity, that is loan to deposit
ratio, that is statistically signi￿cant.
17control group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. Consequently, we need
to satisfy two underlying assumptions of di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence models, namely
that the time e⁄ect ￿t are common across the treated and control groups, and the
composition of the treated and control groups remains stable after the intervention.
Since we use panel data and eliminate ￿i by di⁄erencing, we satisfy the second
assumption. However, we cannot directly test whether the change in banks￿costs
in the control group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. However, we can
test whether the treated and control groups have the same time e⁄ect before the
intervention. If they have a common time trend before the intervention, then it is
likely that when they had not been sold to strategic foreign investors they would
have the same time trend after the intervention.
To formally test the common time trend assumption we estimate the following





￿tDit + f(xit;￿) + ￿zit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it; (2)
where Dit is a dummy variable equals one if bank i is eventually sold to a foreign
investor during the period of analysis and zero otherwise.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The coe¢ cients of interest are ￿
0
ts which measure period t speci￿c outcome di⁄er-
ences between the treated- and control groups prior to the intervention. If we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that ￿
0
ts are jointly equal to zero, then the pre-treatment
trends in the treated group are statistically similar to those in the control group.
Our results in Table 6 are however mixed: Even though we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that ￿
0
ts are jointly equal to zero, we also cannot reject the null
hypothesis that they are jointly positive. Some individual estimates are positive
18and statistically signi￿cant (see Columns 1 and 3). Individual estimates that are
negative are statistically insigni￿cant.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the 95%con￿dence interval for the estimates of the pre-intervention
time e⁄ect using the full sample. The horizontal axis shows all of the quarterly pe-
riods in our sample and the vertical axis shows the estimates of the time e⁄ect (see
also Column 1 of Table 6). The estimates of the time e⁄ect are only statistically
signi￿cant in the ￿rst four quarters and in the thirteenth quarter. In the other quar-
ters, they are positive and are not statistically di⁄erent from zero at 5% signi￿cance
level.
These results therefore do not lend a strong support to our implicit assumption
that the time e⁄ect ￿t is common across the treated and control groups during
the pre-intervention period. It appears that, in some quarters, banks which were
eventually sold to strategic investors had relatively higher costs. We nevertheless
could still interpret our previous estimates as a lower bound of the e⁄ect of the
strategic sale on banks￿costs. We have shown that the strategic sale is associated
with about 15% cost reduction. The actual e⁄ect of strategic sale on the reduction
in banks￿costs may be larger than 15%.
Finally, we can also analyze the evolution of the impact of strategic sale over-
time by modifying Equation (1). We drop the strategic sale dummy and introduce





￿mSm + f(xit;￿) + ￿zit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it: (3)
19In which, Sm is a dummy variable equals one for banks that are owned by foreign
investors and are in their m-th quarter(s) after the acquisition. The coe¢ cient ￿m
captures the average e⁄ect of the strategic sale in period m after the acquisition.
Each ￿m would tell us what happen to banks￿costs in each period: The coe¢ cient
￿0, for example, would capture the e⁄ect of the strategic sale in the acquisition
quarter and ￿1 would capture the e⁄ect in the subsequent quarter. Thus, all of
these ￿0
ms would characterize the quarterly evolution of the e⁄ect of the strategic
sale. The evolution tells us whether the cost reduction happens immediately after
the banks are sold or instead few years later.
Table 7 presents our estimation results. First we include dummies for the quar-
ters in which banks are sold and the three subsequent quarters thereafter. We ￿nd
that the strategic sale can be associated with 1% cost reduction in the acquisition
quarter, and respectively 5%, 8%, and 12% cost reduction in the three subsequent
quarters (see Column 1).18
Further, when we include dummies for all quarters during the period of two years
after the sale, we ￿nd that the strategic sale still contributes to the cost reduction.
Over time, the e⁄ect of the strategic sale on the cost reduction evolves from 4% in
the acquisition quarter to 12% by the end of the second year (see Column 2).19
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
We ￿nd similar results when we control for banks￿time-varying characteristics.
Within a year after the event, the strategic sale leads to 7% cost reduction and
within two years after the event it leads to 9% cost reduction.20 When we use
observations in Common Support 1, we ￿nd that within two years after the strategic
18The ￿rst quarter e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant while the others are statistically signi￿cant
at 5 percent level.
19All dummies are now statistically signi￿cant at 5% level except for the dummy of the ￿rst
quarter which continues to be statistically insigni￿cant.
20For brevity, we do not provide the results.
20sale there is 5% cost reduction (see Column 4), while when we use observations in
Coomon Support 2 we ￿nd that the total impact is around 16% (see Column 6).
The ￿rst estimate is statistically insigni￿cant, however.
Overall, these results are in line with our previous results obtained using di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence models. During the quarter in which banks are sold to strategic in-
vestors, there is no change in banks￿costs. Over time, however, banks￿costs fall
and by the end of the second year after the acquisition, the cost reduction could be
as large as 12%-16%.
6 Robustness Checks
To see whether our results are robust to using other measures of banks￿performance,
we estimate the average treatment e⁄ect on the treated using among others; return
on assets (ROA), net-interest margin (NIM), and the proportion of non-performing
loans (NPL). We run the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence kernel matching estimation. Table
8 presents our results.
Using observations in Common Support 1, the signs of our estimates are similar
to what we expected. The strategic sale is associated with a higher ROA or NIM,
and with a lower NPL (See Rows 1-3 of Table 3.7). However, these estimates are
statistically insigni￿cant.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Using observations in Common Support 2, our estimates also have the expected
signs, although, with the exception of the NPL, they continue to be statistically
insigni￿cant (see Rows 4-6 of Table 3.7). Thus, the strategic sale is associated with
1% increase in either ROA or NIM, and 3.5% decrease in the NPL.
Next, we consider a more homogenous sample by focusing on private banks
21only. We re-estimate Equation (3.2) using both the basic di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimation and the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence matching estimation.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
Table 9 presents the results. Overall, we ￿nd that our results are quite robust. The
strategic sale is associated with 8%-12% cost reduction.
Finally, we estimate the e⁄ect of strategic sale on banks￿cost e¢ ciency using
the standard frontier analysis. We ￿rst assume that the technology is time invari-
ant, and then subsequently we relax this by assuming that the technology is time
variant.21 We present some of the results in Table 10.
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]
In all speci￿cations, we ￿nd that the strategic sale is associated with 15%-35%
lower costs. When we use observations in Common Support 1 only, the estimate of
the e⁄ect of the strategic sale is statistically signi￿cant at 1% level.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, after overcoming problems in treatment evaluation, strategic
sale of banks in developing countries like Indonesia improves banks￿performance.
Economically, the cost reduction is quite large, both right after the banks are
sold and over time since then. Our basic results show that, on average, strategic sale
is associated with 12-15% lower costs. These results are robust to other estimators
such as combined matching and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence, generalized di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence kernel matching, and stochastic frontier analysis. They are robust too to
di⁄erent types of samples. We also ￿nd that strategic sale is associated with the
improvement in the other measures of banks￿performance such as ROA and NIM.
21We use the Batesse and Coelli (1995)￿ s stochastic frontier models.
22We therefore argue that the sale of recapitalized banks to strategic foreign in-
vestors plays an important role in banking restructuring in developing countries.
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Figure 1: The 95 Percent Con￿dence Interval of Preintervention Time E⁄ects
25by gov't by owners
1
State 7 7 7 4
Regional development 27 13 10 4 12
Private national 142 72 40 30 48 4 7 9
No. of
banks
   Bank types
CAR Restructuring methods
Note: This table is adapted from Box 4 of Pangestu and Habir (2002).







Table 1: Indonesia￿ s Bank Restructuring
Ownership Number of banks
State owned 5
Large private national 35
Always domestically owned 29
Sold to strategic investors 6









ln(Cost) 2,408 11.21 1.78
S 2,618 0.02 0.14
ln(Loan) 2,501 13.28 1.88
ln(Asset) 2,509 14.11 1.78
ln(Deposit) 2,488 13.76 1.86
ln(Price) 2,408 -3.96 0.78
Table 3: Summary Statistics
26Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3)
Strategic sale -0.31 -0.15 -0.12
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Public bank dummy No Yes Yes
Translog cost function No Yes Yes
Time-varying characteristics No No Yes
Observations 1,885 1,870 1,682
R
2 0.07 0.98 0.98
Full Sample
Note: All regressions include time and bank fixed effects. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Quarter 1 0.25 -0.13 0.25
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
Quarter 2 0.14 -0.20 0.15
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Quarter 3 0.15 -0.15 0.16
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07)
Quarter 4 0.13 -0.10 0.15
(0.06) (0.10) (0.05)
Quarter 5 0.05 -0.12 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Quarter 6 0.15 -0.08 0.15
(0.12) (0.04) (0.11)
Quarter 7 -0.12 -0.17 -0.11
(0.11) (0.07) (0.12)
Quarter 8 -0.11 -0.23 -0.09
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Quarter 9 -0.07 -0.21 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Quarter 10 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Quarter 11 0.05 -0.03 0.06
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
Quarter 12 0.02 -0.03 0.04
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06)
Quarter 13 0.10 0.13 0.12
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Quarter 14 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Quarter 15 0.00 0.04 0.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Observations 1,825 133 1,732
F-statistics 30.32 9.89 54.89
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R
2 0.94 0.98 0.95
Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6: Common Time-trend Assumption
29Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acquisition quarter -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
One quarter later -0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Two quarters later -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Three quarters later -0.12 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15 -0.19
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Four quarters later -0.12 -0.03 -0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Five quarters later -0.11 -0.06 -0.17
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Six quarters later -0.14 -0.03 -0.20
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Seven quarters later -0.12 -0.05 -0.16
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 1,870 1,870 178 178 1,764 1,764
R






Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7: The E⁄ect of Strategic Sale Overtime
ROA (1) 0.19 (2.78)
NIM (2) 0.24 (1.16)
NPL (3) -3.81 (5.79)
ROA (4) 0.98 (1.12)
NIM (5) 0.95 (0.95)
NPL (6) -8.60 (3.36)
Note: Standard errors for estimates using observations in Common Support 2 are








Table 8: Matching with Other Performance Measures
30Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic sale -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Time-varying characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,345 1,254 124 124 647 596
R






Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 9: More Homogenous Samples
Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic sale -0.29 -0.22 -0.36 -0.15 -0.35 -0.28
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 0.28
Time invariant inefficiency Yes - Yes - Yes -
Time variant inefficiency - Yes - Yes - Yes






Table 10: Stochastic Frontier Analysis
31